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Abstract
Financial intermediaries are, by denition, engaged in two-sided competition. Despite the well-
known problems of achieving competitive solutions under two-sided price competition, models of
nancial intermediation are commonly solved for competitive equilibria. This paper provides a
game-theoretic foundation for competitive equilibria in one of the most important models of nan-
cial intermediation, the seminal Stiglitz-Weiss (1981) adverse selection model of the credit market
with a continuum of borrower types. The approach can readily be adapted to other models of
nancial intermediation as well.
1 Introduction
Financial intermediaries are, by denition, engaged in competition in input (deposit) markets
and output (loan) markets. As noted by Stahl (1988) and Yanelle (1989, 1997), two-sided
price competition does not necessarily give rise to perfectly competitive equilibria, i.e., to the
market outcome that would arise with price-taking behavior. This casts doubt on the common
practice of solving models of nancial intermediation for perfectly competitive equilibria. The
seminal Stiglitz-Weiss (1981) (henceforth: \SW") model is a case in point. The purpose of
the present paper is to provide a game-theoretic foundation for the SW model that yields
the perfectly competitive solution as the outcome of two-sided price competition and that
generalizes to other models of nancial intermediation as well.
To motivate the problem, consider the two-stage game analyzed by Stahl (1988, pp. 195-196),
the terminology adapted to the operation of banks rather than \merchants". Let suciently
well-behaved supply and demand functions for loanable funds be given. The perfectly com-
petitive solution entails that both the deposit rate and the interest rate are equal to the
rate that equates supply of and demand for funds. At stage one, two banks bid for deposits.
The higher bidder gets the whole supply of deposits (\winner-take-all"). In the case of equal
bids, each bank gets the total supply with probability one-half (\random tie-breaking"). At
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stage two, the single bank endowed with loanable funds is a monopolist in the loan market.
When the demand elasticity evaluated at the market-clearing rate is suciently high such
that an increase in the interest rate reduces total repayment (principal plus interest paid
by all rms), the perfectly competitive solution arises as a subgame-perfect equilibrium of
the two-stage game: both banks oer the market-clearing rate to depositors, and the bank
selected by the random tie-breaking rule sets the same rate in the credit subgame. The bank
active at stage two has no incentive to raise the interest rate because of the ensuing drop
in total repayment. Lowering the bid rate at stage one is not protable because, due to
winner-take-all competition, there is no supply left. Bidding higher at stage one leads to
losses because the revenue-maximizing loan rate then falls short of the bid rate. However,
the perfectly competitive solution does not arise if the demand for capital is inelastic, in that
an increase in the interest rate raises total repayment. This is because a bank that acquires
funds at the market-clearing rate at stage one has an incentive to set an interest rate above
the market-clearing rate and hold back funds at stage two then.
Stahl (1988, pp. 196 .) proceeds to show that the perfectly competitive solution generally
arises if the credit subgame precedes the deposit subgame and banks must not default on
their deposit obligations: assuming random tie-breaking in the credit subgame, both banks
set the market-clearing rate at stage one, and the bank selected by the tie-breaking rule bids
the same rate to depositors. It is not feasible to get the required funds at a lower deposit rate
at stage two. Deviating with a higher interest rate at stage one is not protable, because
there is no residual demand left. Setting a lower rate at stage one yields losses, because
this forces a bank pay a deposit rate above the market-clearing level in order to meet its
obligations at stage two.
This second double-Bertrand game, in which competition in the \output" market precedes
competition in the \input market" appears of particular relevance for nancial intermedi-
ation. For one thing, as pointed out above, nancial intermediation is a prime example of
two-sided competition (see Freixas and Rochet, 1997, Section 3.4). For another, the order of
the stages is a natural way to express the fact that banks make long-term commitments by
rolling over short-term debt. Thus, the reinterpretation of the Stahl (1988) model as a model
of the capital market provides a sound game-theoretic foundation for perfectly competitive
nancial intermediation in a frictionless environment.
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Matters are more complicated in markets with informational frictions, however. Two of the
startling features of capital markets with asymmetric information are rationing and two-price
equilibria, i.e., the \Repeal of the Law of Supply and Demand" and the \Repeal of the Law
of the Single Price" (Stiglitz, 1987, pp. 4 and 7, resp.). The SW model is at the center of our
analysis for the reason that it potentially gives rise to either of these two types of equilibria:
Coco (1997) and Arnold and Riley (2009) show that a two-price allocation is an equilibrium
of the model with price-taking behavior in the deposit market when the return on lending
is a non-monotonic function of the interest rate and there is excess demand at the local
maximum (and there is no market-clearing interest rate that yields a higher return).1 If the
model is modied such that riskier projects have a lower expected return, the return function
may be hump-shaped and pure credit rationing may arise, as stressed by SW. This raises
the question of whether these types of equilibria, like the perfectly competitive solution in
the frictionless case, can also be given a sound game-theoretic foundation.
The Stahl (1988) model does not lend itself directly to this setup with informational frictions.
It assumes that banks satisfy the entire market demand at the quoted interest rate. This
is inconsistent with either credit rationing or a two-price allocation with excess demand at
the lower rate. So, to make the Stahl (1988) approach applicable to rationing or two-price
equilibria, we assume that a bank's strategy space consists of an interest rate and a limit
on the amount of credit oered (a \credit limit"2) in the credit subgame and of a deposit
rate and a maximum demand for funds in the deposit subgame. This modied double-
Bertrand approach yields the desired game-theoretic foundation for the respective types of
equilibria: the market-clearing, rationing, and two-price equilibria arise as subgame-perfect
Nash equilibria (SPNE) of the two-stage game under the respective assumptions about the
return function.3 We also show how the modied double-Bertrand approach carries over to
alternative models of nancial intermediation as well. Thus, our modied double-Bertrand
1Related papers which cast doubt on the theoretical importance of credit rationing in SW-type models
include Bester (1985), Riley (1987), De Meza and Webb (1987, 2006), and Lensink and Sterken (2002).
2Notice that the term \credit limit" does not refer to the size of an individual loan but to the \number"
(mass) of loans a bank makes. De Meza and Webb's (2006) work shows that the distinction is crucial: with
variable loan size rationing phenomena disappear altogether.
3This is our pragmatic denition of a \game-theoretic foundation for competitive equilibria": a specic
game structure that yields the \equilibria" described in the literature as an SPNE (cf., by contrast, the
\Foundations of Competitive Equilibria" in Mas-Colell et al. (1995, ch. 18).
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approach yields a solid game-theoretic foundation for the common practice of solving models
of nancial intermediation such as the SW model for perfectly competitive equilibria.
Building this foundation for competitive equilibria in the SW model requires making several
choices, e.g., with regard to how many loans dierent banks charging the same interest rate
make and which amount of deposits banks bidding the same rate receive. While we are
condent that our approach is robust to modications of the rules of the game (except that,
as explained above, the sequencing of the two subgames is crucial), one might validly object
that we merely present one specication that yields the perfectly competitive outcome as an
SPNE. However, the main motivation for the present analysis is that there is no such game
in the existing literature. So the present analysis provides one way of lling this big gap in
the literature.
There are two other resolutions to the problem that two-sided price competition does not
necessarily give rise to a perfectly competitive equilibrium. First, Allen and Hellwig (1986)
show that the equilibrium prices of the mixed-strategy game converge in distribution to com-
petitive prices as the number of rms becomes large. Relatedly, Dixon (1987) demonstrates
that as the economy is replicated a suciently large number of times, a competitive approx-
imate equilibrium exists. This approach is not helpful for our purposes, however, because
input prices (i.e., in our context, the deposit rate) are taken as given. Moreover, compet-
itive solutions in Dixon's model require ecient rationing, which is incompatible with the
information structure assumed by SW. Second, Gersbach (2002, 2008) derives a competitive
double-Bertrand equilibrium in a nancial market in which the deposit subgame precedes the
credit subgame and with endogenous market-side switching (i.e., as the interest rate rises,
entrepreneurs supply their endowments to the market rather than demand additional funds
in order to invest). This approach is not suitable for our purposes either, because, though
there is rationing out of equilibrium, it relies on market clearing in equilibrium.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briey recapitulates the assumptions of the SW
model and explains double-Bertrand competition in detail. Section 3 proves that the the
two-interest allocation is the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of the double-Bertrand
game. Section 4 is concerned with the SW model with a monotonic or a hump-shaped return
function. Alternative models of nancial intermediation are considered in Section 5. Section
6 concludes. Details of the proofs of theorems are delegated to a technical appendix.
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2 Model
This section introduces the model. We rst briey recapitulate the assumptions of the well-
known SW adverse selection model with a continuum of borrower types.4 We then state our
assumptions with regard to price competition in the markets for loans and deposits.
Firms and projects
The model covers two time periods, 1 and 2. There is a continuum of length N (> 0) of
rms of dierent types, . The distribution of rm types, G(), is strictly increasing and
continuous and has (bounded) support [0; max]. In period 1, each rm has access to one
indivisible investment project with uncertain payo R ( 0) in period 2. The distribution
of returns on the projects of type- rms is denoted as F (Rj). F (Rj) is continuous in R
for all . The returns on dierent projects are independent. All types of projects have the
same expected return, R: ER(Rj) = R for all . It is assumed that if 0 > , the distribution
F (Rj0) is a mean-preserving spread of F (Rj): R x
0
F (Rj0)dR > R x
0
F (Rj)dR for all x > 0.
In this sense, the higher , the riskier the project. Each project requires a capital input B
(0 < B < R). Banks collect deposits and make xed-interest loans to rms. This process
involves no factor cost. There is asymmetric information: rms observe their own type ,
while banks do not. As a result, the interest rate(s) charged r cannot be made contingent on
borrower types . Firms are risk-neutral and apply for credit if their project yields a non-
negative expected prot. The supply of capital LS() is a continuous and strictly increasing
function of the interest rate paid on deposits  with LS(0)  0 and LS()!1 for !1.
Double-Bertrand competition
Banks are distinguished by an index k 2 f1; : : : ; Kg = K. The number of banks is at least
four (i.e., two per interest rate in a two-interest rate equilibrium): K > 4. The banks play
a two-stage game, rst stage the credit subgame, then the deposit subgame. In the credit
subgame, bank k's strategy is a pair (rk; k) 2 R2+. rk is the interest rate k sets and k a
credit limit (explained below). If there are several equilibrium interest rates, rms apply for
credit at the lowest interest rate rst and turn to the next-highest interest rate if rationed.
If several banks charge the same interest rate rk, the bank with the highest credit limit k
alone faces the market demand at rk. If several banks choose the maximum credit limit at
4The analysis is very similar with a nite set of borrower types.
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rk, then a tie-breaking rule randomly selects one of them, which then serves the market
demand at rk alone. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the tie-breaking rule assigns
the same probability to each bank setting the maximum credit limit.5 Hence, at each interest
rate rk the (residual) demand is served by a single bank k. Its credit limit k obliges this
bank to supply the minimum of k and (residual) demand at rk to the market. In the deposit
subgame, bank k's strategy is a pair (k; k) 2 R2+. k is the amount of deposits k demands at
the bid rate k.
6 The bids are served in the order of decreasing deposit rates. If the (residual)
supply of deposits does not fall short of demand at a given deposit rate k, then each bank k
which bids k gets k and lenders are rationed randomly. If the demand for deposits exceeds
(residual) supply at k, then the banks k which bid k share the supply in proportion to
the volumes k they demand.
7 There is no secondary market for deposits. Following Stahl
(1988, pp. 196-197), we assume that a bank's payo in the case of default (i.e., if it fails to
renance its credit given) is a negative constant  (< 0).8
3 Equilibrium
Return function
As shown by SW, the credit market equilibrium is characterized by adverse selection: rms
apply for credit if and only if their project is suciently risky. Formally, let (R; r) =
maxfR   (1 + r)B; Cg denote a rm's prot. A rm with a type- project applies for
credit if and only if ER[(R; r)j]  0. Given the mean-preserving spread assumption,
5More generally, we could assume that it assigns an arbitrary strictly positive probability to each bank.
The analysis is unaected.
6Competition is not \winner-take-all".
7This kind of coordination is needed in order to avoid default caused by the mechanism that determines
the allocation of deposits to banks (cf. Stahl, 1988, p. 198).
8The assumption that a bank defaults if it does not raise deposits equal to or greater than the amount
of loans it makes implies that banks have no alternative source of funds in period 1. On the other hand,
negative payos may occur for banks (o the equilibrium path), which assumes that banks have funds they
can use to cover losses in period 2. So we implicitly assume that banks have period-2 income but cannot
borrow against this in period 1. An alternative interpretation is that banks are intermediaries for trade in
physical, not nancial, capital. Clearly, banks then have to default if the amount of funds raised falls short
of credit given.
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this condition is satised for   #(r), where #(r) is an increasing function dened by
ER[(R; r)j#(r)] = 0. The maximum interest rate above which no rm demands a loan is
denoted rmax: ER[(R; r
max)jmax] = 0.
Each bank's pool of borrowers has the same risk characteristics, so the rate of return on
lending can be expressed as a function of the interest rate alone:
%(r) =
R  ER;[(R; r)j  #(r)]
B
  1; (1)
SW observe that the return function %(r) is not necessarily monotonic. This is because an
increase in the interest rate means that those borrowers who repay repay more, but since the
risk pool worsens, the proportion of borrowers who do repay falls. This means that a small
increase in the interest rate may be harmful, rather than benecial, to the banks.
Coco (1997) and Arnold and Riley (2009) show, however, that %(r) attains its unique global
maximum R=B   1 at rmax (see the upper panel of Figure 1). This follows from (1) and the
observations that
ER;[(R; r
max)j  #(rmax)] = ER[(R; rmax)jmax] = 0
and
ER;[(R; r)j  #(r)] > 0; for r < rmax
(since ER[(R; r)jmax > 0). Intuitively, whenever r < rmax, the riskiest rms make positive
expected prot, so the banks' return on lending falls short of the expected rate of return
of the investment projects. When r = rmax, only the riskiest borrower class remains in the
market and makes zero expected prot. This is the only possibility for banks to generate a
rate of return equal to the expected rate of return of the investment projects. In particular,
this means that the return function cannot have the hump shape assumed by SW.
For the sake of expositional convenience, we assume in what follows that %(r) is continuous,
has a unique interior local maximum  at the interest rate r, and is positive-valued for
all r  r (see the upper panel of Figure 1).9 It follows that there is a unique interest rate
r > r such that %(r) =  and that %(r) increases for r > r.
9Arnold and Riley (2009) show that %(r) is discontinuous if the lower bound of the support of F (Rj) is
identical for a positive mass of borrower types .
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Figure 1: Return function and credit market
Supply and demand
To focus on non-market-clearing equilibria, we assume that
LD(r) < LS() < LD(r)
(see the lower panel of Figure 1). This rules out several types of equilibria.10 First, there is
not a market-clearing equilibrium with r < r, since there is excess demand. Second, there is
a market-clearing interest rate above r. But this interest rate cannot arise in an equilibrium
with zero prot for banks either, because banks could raise expected prot by underbidding
with the interest rate r. Moreover, there cannot be a pure rationing equilibrium in which
banks set the interest rate r and pay  to depositors. This is because it would be protable
to deviate with an interest rate close to rmax: there is positive residual demand due to
rationing at r; the return on lending rises, since %(r) attains its global maximum at rmax;
and if the amount of loans made is suciently small, the deposit rate rises only slightly.
Existence of a two-price equilibrium
The clue to nding an equilibrium is in found SW (pp. 398-399) in their discussion of a
return function with multiple humps: we have to look for an equilibrium with two interest
10The arguments put forward in this paragraph are somewhat heuristic. They will be made precise in the
proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 below.
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rates and equality of residual supply and residual demand at the higher rate. Accordingly,
let
L =
LS()  LD(r)
LD(r)  LD(r)L
D(r): (2)
Suppose banks give credit L at r and LS()   L at r and pay the deposit rate .
Since %(r) = %(r) = , they make zero prot. Residual supply and demand at r are
LS() L and [1 L=LD(r)]LD(r). From (2), residual supply equals residual demand.
The following theorem states that this two-price allocation is the outcome of the double-
Bertrand competition in the markets for credit and deposits.
THEOREM 1: The following pure strategies represent an SPNE:
,! in the credit subgame, (rk; k) = (r; L) for two banks k, (rk; k) = (r; LS()   L)
for two banks k, and (rk; k) = (0; 0) for the other banks k 2 K;
,! in the deposit subgame, the bank k setting r and selected by the tie-breaking rule
chooses (k; k) = (
; L), the bank k setting r and selected by the tie-breaking rule chooses
(k; k) = (
; LS()  L), and all other banks k 2 K choose (k; k) = (0; 0).
Clearly, the strategies described in Theorem 1 yield the two-price allocation, with zero prot
for all banks. Since there is no residual demand, it is not possible to make positive prot
with r > r. The proof of Theorem 1 requires a careful analysis of the residual supply and
demand functions, which is delegated to Appendix A. Appendix B provides a rigorous proof
of the theorem. Here we give a non-technical sketch. To simplify matters, we let  =  1
here. This rules out default by banks (in and out of equilibrium) by assumption.11
Solving the model backwards, consider the rst the deposit subgame. Let lk denote credit
given by bank k at stage one and
 = (LS) 1
 X
k2K
lk
!
(3)
the deposit rate that is just sucient to raise the required amount of funds. The following
lemma summarizes banks' behavior in the deposit subgame.
LEMMA 1: The following strategies represent a Nash equilibrium of the deposit subgame:
11In banking theory, the no-default assumption has been popularized by Ben Bernanke and Mark Gertler
(1987, p. 96). At a practical level, it can be motivated by the various solvency regulations unique to the
banking sector.
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(k; k) = (; lk) for each bank k with lk > 0, and (k; k) = (0; 0) for each bank k with
lk = 0.
For banks with lk > 0, bidding lower or reducing the demand for funds means default:
deposits are insucient to make the promised loans (and the payo is  =  1). Bidding
higher or increasing the demand for funds also reduces prot, since interest income is already
determined in the credit subgame. For banks with lk = 0, attracting funds is unprotable
because they do not lend. For future reference, we note that the equilibrium deposit rate 
in (3) is a continuous and strictly increasing function of aggregate credit given
P
k2K lk.
Given the credit-subgame strategies in Theorem 1, we have
P
k2K lk = L
 + [LS()  
L] = LS(), so  = (LS) 1[LS()] = (LS) 1(
P
k2K lk). It follows from Lemma 1 that the
strategies for the deposit subgame described in the theorem constitute a Nash equilibrium
of the resulting deposit subgame.
Turning to the credit subgame (i.e., stage one of the double-Bertrand game), consider a
given strategy prole, f(rk; k)gk2K. The set of market interest rates is frj rk = r and lk >
0 for some k 2 Kg.
LEMMA 2: Suppose the strategy prole in the credit subgame changes such that one of the
following two situations arises:
,! credit given becomes positive at one interest rate formerly not contained in the set
of market interest rates; for all initial market interest rates, the maximum credit limit k
remains the same;
,! the set of market interest rates remains unchanged; credit given rises for exactly one
market interest rate; for all other initial market interest rates, the maximum credit limit k
remains the same;
then aggregate credit given rises.
The proof of the lemma is tedious, but the assertion made is straightforward: if some bank
makes additional loans at some interest rate, the total amount of loans made increases.
Together with Lemma 1 and (3), it follows that the deposit rate also increases. Bearing this
in mind, it is straightforward to show that it is not protable to deviate from the strategies
in Theorem 1 in the credit subgame. Strategies with an interest rate above r do not attract
rms, since there is no residual demand. By oering credit in excess of LS()  L at r a
bank overbids the highest credit limit, thereby capturing the residual demand. However, as
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there is no excess demand at r, the amount of credit given does not rise, so that zero prot
ensues. Firms can also be attracted by oering more funds at r or by setting an interest
rate below r other than r. However, this yields losses because the return on lending is
no greater than  and the additional demand for deposits raises the deposit rate above .
This proves Theorem 1.
\Uniqueness"
The SPNE in Theorem 1 is not unique: in the deposit subgame, banks k with lk = 0 can
play any strategy that leads to zero deposits; and in the credit subgame, any strategy that
yields lk = 0 with certainty also yields zero prot. However, all SPNE strategies lead to the
same market outcome:
THEOREM 2: In any pure-strategy SPNE, r and r are the only market interest rates;
credit given at these two interest rates equals L and LS(), respectively; the single market
deposit rate is ; and the supply of deposits is LS().
The proof is in Appendix C. Again, we give an informal sketch here, maintaining the as-
sumption that banks avoid default under all circumstances (i.e.,  =  1).
Consider rst the deposit subgame. Let dk denote bank k's deposits. In any Nash equilibrium
of the deposit subgame, each bank k must get dk  lk in order to avoid default. If dk > lk,
k can raise its prot by reducing k and, therefore, dk. So dk = lk for all k. Suppose a bank
with lk > 0 bids k <  (with  given by (3)) and gets the funds it needs. Since k   for
all k implies that the amount of deposits is insucient to renance aggregate credit given,
we must have k >  for some other bank. This cannot happen in a Nash equilibrium, since
this latter bank could then get its funds more cheaply. So k   for all k with lk > 0. But
then again, a bank with k >  could get the deposits it needs more cheaply. It follows that
dk = lk for all k and k =  for all k such that lk > 0 in any Nash equilibrium of the deposit
subgame. Thus, for given loan volumes lk determined in the credit subgame, the amount of
deposits and the market deposit rates are uniquely determined. For future reference, we note
that from dk = lk and k = , bank k's payo is
k = [%(rk)  ]lk:
Turning to the credit subgame, we show rst that all banks make zero expected prot Ek
(expectations being taken when the random tie-breaking rule determines which banks make
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loans). This follows from standard Bertrand arguments. It suces to argue that not all
banks make positive expected prot, for if some banks make prots and others do not, the
latter have an incentive to adopt one of the former's strategies. If all banks make positive
expected prot, then each bank sets a dierent interest rate. This is because each of two
banks charging the same interest rate has an incentive to push its direct competitor out of
the market, by either raising the credit limit (if there is excess demand) or undercutting the
competitor's interest rate slightly (if there is no excess demand). Moreover, there cannot be
excess demand at the highest interest rate if all rms make positive expected prot. If excess
demand prevailed, then the bank charging the highest interest rate, K say, could increase its
expected prot by changing rK such that its return rises holding credit given constant (i.e.,
without aecting the deposit rate). Thus, either no bank makes positive expected prot,
or else all banks make positive expected prot, each setting a dierent interest rate, and
supply equals residual demand at the highest interest rate. Consider the two banks, K and
K   1, say, setting the highest and second-highest interest rates, rK and rK 1, respectively.
By oering slightly more funds than K 1 at rK 1, bank K pushes K 1 out of the market.
As credit given at rK 1 increases slightly and credit given at rK drops to zero, the deposit
rate  falls, and K's resulting prot (1+)(EK) is higher than K 1's expected prot was:
(1 + )(EK) > EK 1. Conversely, let K   1 withdraw its credit oer at rK 1 and fully
satisfy the residual demand at an interest rate slightly below rK . This implies that K drops
out of the market, and K 1's credit given is higher than K's was. Since the average interest
rate at which the residual demand that prevails at rK 1 is satised rises (from a weighted
average of rK 1 and rK to slightly less than rK), aggregate credit given falls by a non-
innitesimal amount and so does the equilibrium deposit rate . As K 1's return is close to
%(rK), the deposit rate jumps downward, and credit given exceeds lK , it follows that K 1's
ensuing expected prot (1 + )(EK 1) is higher than K's was: (1 + )(EK 1) > EK .
This contradicts the denition of a Nash equilibrium (which entails Ek  (1+)(Ek) for
k 2 fK   1; Kg):
EK  (1 + )(EK) > EK 1  (1 + )(EK 1) > EK :
So any equilibrium is characterized by zero expected prot for all banks.
Given zero prot, we can rule out the possibility of an equilibrium with credit given at a
single interest rate, r1 say (this implies non-existence of market-clearing or pure-rationing
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equilibria, as mentioned in Section 3). Excess demand for credit in a single-interest rate
equilibrium implies that banks can make positive prot by making a small \number" of loans
at an interest rate close to rmax. So credit given in a single-interest rate equilibrium is LD(r1),
and, from (3), the bank which gives credit at r1 bids the deposit rate 1 = (L
S) 1[LD(r1)].
Together with zero expected prot (i.e., %(r1) = 1), it follows that L
S[%(r1)] = L
D(r1).
Due to the assumed shape of the return, demand, and supply functions (with LD(r) <
LS[%(r)] = LS[%(r)] < LD(r)), this implies that r1 is in the interval (r; r), so there
is positive demand at r (see Figure 1). Together with %(r1) < , it follows further that
making a small \number" of loans at r is protable, since the ensuing return, , is higher
than %(r1) and the deposit rate  rises only slightly.
r and r are the only market interest rates. Suppose not. Given that all banks make the
same expected prot (viz., zero), the fact that the number of market interest rates exceeds
one, and the assumed shape of the return function, there are two or three interest rates, each
yields a return strictly less than , and one market interest rate is in the interval (r; r)
(see the upper panel of Figure 1). But then again it is possible to make positive expected
prot by oering a small amount of credit at r.
At least two banks set the maximum credit limit at r. Otherwise the single bank setting the
maximum credit limit at r can make positive expected prot by decreasing its credit limit
slightly, so that the deposit rate  falls, while the return on lending  is unaected. And at
least two banks set a credit limit at r that is at least as large as the residual demand. If
all credit limits at r fall short of residual demand, then there is positive residual demand
for all interest rates up to rmax, so it is protable to make loans at close to rmax. If only one
bank sets a credit limit equal to or greater than residual demand, then this bank gains from
increasing the interest rate it charges slightly and satisfying the residual demand at that
interest rate: as it withdraws its credit oer at r, it generates positive residual demand
above r, so that expected returns above  can be achieved. At the same time, as the
residual demand which prevails at r is satised at a higher interest rate on average, credit
given and the deposit rate  fall.
Total credit given at r and r equals LS(). Otherwise the equilibrium deposit rate deviates
from , which contradicts zero expected prot. A decrease in credit given at r implies a less
than one-for-one decrease in the residual demand at r. This is because only the suciently
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risky proportion of the additionally rationed borrowers demand loans at r. So aggregate
credit given at r and r falls below LS() when credit given at r falls below LS(), a
contradiction. Conversely, when credit exceeds L at r, residual demand at r falls less
than one-for-one, so there is excess demand at at r. This is inconsistent with equilibrium,
since banks could make positive prot by making a small \number" of loans at an interest
rate close to rmax.
4 Variations of the model
Theorems 1 and 2 state that double-Bertrand competition in the markets for credit (stage
one) and deposits (stage two) uniquely gives rise to a two-price equilibrium when the return
on lending is a non-monotonic function of the interest rate with excess demand at the local
maximum and there is no market-clearing interest rate that yields a higher return. This
section argues that this modied double-Bertrand competition is a natural approach to
nding competitive equilibria in the SW model, because it gives rise to the usual kinds of
equilibria under alternative assumptions about the shape of the return function, viz., market
clearing when the return function is monotonic and credit rationing when it is hump-shaped
and there is excess demand at the return-maximizing rate.
Monotonic return function
Suppose the return function %(r) is continuous and monotonic, so that the composite loan
supply function LS[%(r)] is also monotonically increasing. Suppose further that there is a
market-clearing interest rate r (see the left panel of Figure 2). Let   %(r) and L  LS().
The following theorem states that equality of supply and demand then holds true generally:
THEOREM 3: Suppose %(r) is continuous and monotonic and there is r such that LS(%(r)) =
LD(r). Then the following pure strategies represent an SPNE:
,! in the credit subgame, (rk; k) = (r; L) for two banks k and (rk; k) = (0; 0) for the
other banks k 2 K;
,! in the deposit subgame, the bank k setting r and selected by the tie-breaking rule chooses
(k; k) = (; L) and all other banks k 2 K choose (k; k) = (0; 0).
The deposit rate, interest rate, and amounts of deposits and credit are the same in any
pure-strategy SPNE.
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Figure 2: Credit market with monotonic or hump-shaped return function
The rst part of the theorem is clear enough. There is no residual demand at interest rates
above the market-clearing level. And setting an interest rate r below r is unprotable, be-
cause this yields %(r) <  and, from Lemmas 1 and 2, raises the deposit rate. As for the
\uniqueness" part, we merely have to adapt a few steps in the proofs of Theorem 2. Details
are in Appendix D. The arguments used to rule out positive expected prot in equilibrium
in the proof of Theorem 2 apply here as well. Together with the fact that all banks pay the
same deposit rate in equilibrium, it follows that all banks that make loans earn the same rate
of return. Given the monotonicity of the return function, this means that there is a single
market interest rate. If the single market interest rate is above the market-clearing level r,
there is excess supply of deposits, so it would be protable to acquire funds at a deposit
rate below  and lend at an interest rate slightly below r. Conversely, if the market interest
rate falls short of the market-clearing level, there is excess demand in the credit market and
banks can make positive prot by lending at a rate slightly below rmax.
Hump-shaped return function
From the analysis in Section 3, it follows that in order to obtain a hump-shaped return
function, we have to modify the assumptions made in Section 2. Accordingly, let the projects'
expected return ER(Rj) be lower for projects with higher . That is, high- projects are
not only more risky (in terms of second-order stochastic dominance) but worse in terms
of expected return. Then we can assume that the return function %(r) takes on a unique
interior maximum , at a \bank-optimal" interest rate r, say.12 Suppose further there is
12For instance, let type- projects succeed with probability 1   and fail otherwise. The payo is R=(1 
) +  ( R +    B > B   C >  > 0) in case of success and zero otherwise. G() is uniform on [0; 1].
Expected prot is zero for type #(r) = [(1+ r)B    R]=[(1+ r)B   C]. For r  (+ R)=B  1 ( r),
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excess demand at the bank-optimal rate: LD(r) > LS() ( L) (see the right panel of
Figure 2). In this case, the double-Bertrand price-setting game uniquely yields the SW credit
rationing equilibrium:
THEOREM 4: Suppose %(r) is hump-shaped and LD(r) > LS(). Then the following pure
strategies represent an SPNE:
,! in the credit subgame, (rk; k) = (r; L) for two banks k and (rk; k) = (0; 0) for the
other banks k 2 K;
,! in the deposit subgame, the bank k setting r and selected by the tie-breaking rule chooses
(k; k) = (
; L) and all other banks k 2 K choose (k; k) = (0; 0).
The deposit rate, interest rate, and amounts of deposits and credit are the same in any
pure-strategy SPNE.
Again, the rst part of the theorem is obvious: from Lemmas 1 and 2, the deposit rate rises
above  if entry into the loan market is successful, while the expected rate of return cannot
exceed . The same arguments as above prove that banks make zero expected prot in
equilibrium. Given that banks pay the same deposit rate, it follows that all market interest
rates yield the same expected return. So given the hump shape of the return function, either
there is a single market interest rate, or else there are two equilibrium interest rates, one
below and the other above r. In the latter case, as there is positive residual demand at r,
it would be protable to make a small \number" of loans at r. So all loans are made at
the same interest rate. If this rate exceeds r, there is positive residual demand at r, and
it is protable to make a small `number" of loans at r. From the assumption that there is
excess demand at r, it follows that there is excess demand at lower rates. So if the single
market interest rate is lower than r, there is positive residual demand at r, and again it is
protable to make a small \number" of loans at r.
we have #(r)  0, so all rms demand loans. The return function %(r) = C=B   1 + [(1 + r)B   C]=(2B)
is upward-sloping in this case. Due to the parameter constraint, %(r) = ( R +  + C)=(2B)   1 > 0.
For r > r, the constraint R > C ensures #0(r) > 0, i.e., there is adverse selection. The return function
%(r) = C=B   1 + [( R  C)=(2B)][(1 + r)B   C]=[(1 + r)B      C] is downward-sloping.
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5 Application to alternative models
In the preceding section, we argued that the modied double-Bertrand approach provides a
natural foundation for competitive equilibria in the SW model, because it gives rise to the
usual kinds of equilibria, depending on the shape of the return function. In this section, we
argue that, more generally, the modied double-Bertrand approach provides a rigorous game-
theoretic foundation for competitive equilibria in other models of nancial intermediation
as well. We substantiate this claim by incorporating modied double-Bertrand competition
into several simple models of nancial intermediation with dierent informational frictions
(evidently, this endeavor cannot aim at being exhaustive). This requires only minor modica-
tions of the analysis in the preceding sections. This is because, like the SW adverse selection
model, standard credit market models give rise to a (return) function %(r) : R+ ! R that re-
lates the return on lending to the interest rate r independently of other endogenous variables.
Equilibrium in the deposit and loan markets can then be analyzed using demand LD(r) and
(composite) supply LS(%(r)) following exactly the same steps as in the SW model.
First-order dominance
Suppose projects of type  yield a certain payo R(). R() is monotonically decreasing, so
low- projects rst-order (stochastically) dominate high- projects (cf. DeMeza and Webb,
1987). Firms demand capital if R()  (1 + r)B, i.e., if   R 1((1 + r)B). The demand for
capital is thus LD(r)  G(R 1((1 + r)B)). As there is no default risk, the return on lending
is given by the return function
%(r) = r:
Capital supply LS(%(r)) = LS(r) increases monotonically with the interest rate r. By the
reasoning put forward in the SW model with a monotonic return function in Section 4, the
equilibrium is uniquely characterized by the interest rate r that equates supply and demand
(i.e., LS(r) = LD(r)).
Moral hazard
Consider N (> 0) rms endowed with one project per capita. Each project requires input B
(> 0). If it succeeds, it yields R (> 0). If it fails, it yields nothing. The success probability
p(e) is a continuously dierentiable function of eort e (with p0(e) > 0 and 0  p(e)  1).
Eort has a cost c(e) (twice continuously dierentiable with c0(e) > 0 and c00(e)  0).
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Ignoring collateral, a rm's expected prot is E((r; e)) = p(e)[R   (1 + r)B]. Let e(r) =
argmaxeE[(r; e)]. Firms demand a loan and choose e = e(r) if E[(r; e(r))]  0. Otherwise,
they choose not to carry out their project. That is, the demand for capital is NB for r up
rmax, where E[(rmax; e(rmax))] = 0. We assume that the banks' return on lending
%(r) = p(e(r))(1 + r)  1
is a hump-shaped function of the interest rate with a positive maximum, at r say.13 Finally,
we assume that the supply of capital at r falls short of supply: S(%(r)) < NB. By the
same arguments as in Section 4, the equilibrium is a rationing equilibrium.
Limited enforcement
Finally, assume that lenders cannot perfectly enforce repayment, even if they can observe
R: what they can do is impose a non-pecuniary penalty (R) on a borrower with payo
R who decides not to repay, where (R) is assumed strictly increasing. The distribution of
returns F (R) is identical for each rm and has bounded support [0; Rmax]. Borrowers choose
to repay if, any only if, R   1((1 + r)B). The return on lending is given by the return
function
%(r) = (1 + r)[1  F ( 1((1 + r)B)]  1:
Let rmax denote the interest rate at which the probability of repayment becomes zero:
rmax = (Rmax)=B   1. The return function takes on its minimum value at this interest
rate: %(rmax) =  1. So it has an interior maximum at some r.14 If there is excess demand at
r, then by the same arguments as in Section 4, the equilibrium is a rationing equilibrium.
6 Conclusion
Financial intermediation, by denition, leads to two-sided competition. Generally, double-
Bertrand competition in the markets for credit and deposits possibly gives rise to existence
13For instance, let R > 2B and p(e) = e and c(e) = e2=2 for 0  e  1. Then e(r) = R   (1 + r)B, rms
demand a loan if r  R=B   1, and the return function %(r) = [R  (1 + r)B](1 + r)  1 attains an interior
maximum of R2=(4B)  1 at r = R=(2B)  1.
14For instance, let (R) = R (0 <  < 1) and F (R) = R=Rmax for R 2 [0; Rmax]. Then the return
function is %(r) = r (1+r)2B=(Rmax) and takes on its maximum value (Rmax=(2B) 1) = Rmax=(4B)
at r = Rmax=(2B)  1.
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problems and non-competitive equilibria. We show that in the SW adverse selection model
with a continuum of borrower types the usual types of competitive equilibria (with two
prices or with market clearing or rationing at a single price) emerge in any subgame-prefect
equilibrium of the double-Bertrand game if the credit subgame precedes the deposit subgame
and banks can set limits on the amounts of credit they oer and deposits they take. The
analysis is readily adapted to other models of nancial intermediation as well. Thus, the
modied double-Bertrand approach yields a solid game-theoretic foundation for the common
practice of solving models of nancial intermediation for perfectly competitive equilibria.
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A Game-Theoretic Foundation for Competitive Equilibria in the
Stiglitz-Weiss Model: Technical Appendix
Appendix A. Residual supply, residual demand, and
payos
A.1 Residual supply
In the deposit subgame, bank k's strategy is (k; k). Let dk denote the amount of deposits bank
k 2 K gets. Given that the bids are served in the order of decreasing rates k, dk = 0 for banks
with k below some marginal rate. Let D  fj k =  and dk > 0 for some k 2 Kg be the set of
market deposit rates, i.e., of rates such that some bank raises a positive amount of deposits. Let
the market deposit rates n 2 D be ordered such that 1 > 2 >    > N , where N is the number
of market deposit rates. Let Dn be the total amount of deposits taken by banks at the deposit rate
n. Let l
S
n() denote the residual supply at  > n 1. Because of random rationing, residual supply
is determined recursively by
lSn+1() =

1  Dn
lSn(n)

lSn();  > n; (A.1)
for n 2 NnfNg, where N  f1; : : : ; Ng.
LEMMA A.1: Residual supply satises lS1 (1) = L
S(1) and
lSn() =
"
1 
n 1X
n0=1
Dn0
LS(n0)
#
LS();  > n 1; (A.2)
for n 2 Nnf1g.
Proof: The assertion is evidently true for n = 1. The validity of (A.2) for n > 1 is proved by
induction, by substituting from the induction hypothesis (A.2) into (A.1):
lSn+1() =

1  Dn
lSn(n)

lSn()
= lSn() Dn
lSn()
lSn(n)
=
"
1 
n 1X
n0=1
Dn0
LS(n0)
#
LS()  Dn
LS(n)
LS()
=
"
1 
nX
n0=1
Dn0
LS(n0)
#
LS(): ===
1
For n 2 N , let Kn = fk 2 Kj k = ng denote the set of banks which play n in the deposit
subgame. The amount of deposits raised by a bank k 2 Kn is
dk = min

k;
kP
k02Kn k0
lSn(n)

: (A.3)
dk = 0 if k 62 Kn for all n 2 N . The total amount of deposits with deposit rate n is
Dn =
X
k2Kn
dk: (A.4)
The fact that there is positive (residual) supply at n implies that there is excess supply at the
lower market deposit rates:
lSn(n) >
X
k02Kn
k0
for n 2 NnfNg. So from (A.3), dk = k for k 2 Kn and
Dn =
X
k2Kn
k (A.5)
for n 2 NnfNg.
LEMMA A.2: If n   for all n 2 N and N < , then
NX
n=1
Dn < L
S():
Proof: Since LS() is strictly increasing, we have LS(n)  LS() for all n 2 N and LS(N ) < LS().
Using DN  lSN (N ) and (A.2), we obtain:
DN  lSN (N )
=
"
1 
N 1X
n0=1
Dn0
LS(n0)
#
LS(N )
<
"
1 
N 1X
n0=1
Dn0
LS(n0)
#
LS()
= LS() 
N 1X
n0=1
LS()
LS(n0)
Dn0
 LS() 
N 1X
n0=1
Dn0
NX
n=1
Dn < L
S(): ===
2
Starting from a given strategy prole, let x denote the change in a variable x induced by a change
in the strategies, so that (1 + )x is the new value this variable takes on. As a direct corollary to
Lemma A.1, we obtain from (A.2):
LEMMA A.3: If the amount of deposits raised at n 1 changes by Dn 1, the residual supply at
n changes by
lSn(n) =  
LS(n)
LS(n 1)
Dn 1
(n 2 Nnf1g). lSn(n)!  Dn 1 as n ! n 1.
A.2 Residual demand
In the credit subgame, bank k's strategy is (rk; k). Let lk denote the amount of loans actually
made by bank k 2 K. Given that rms apply for credit at the lowest rates rst, lk = 0 for banks
with rk above some marginal rate. Let R  frj rk = r and lk > 0 for some k 2 Kg be the set of
market interest rates, i.e., at which the amount of loans made is positive. Let the interest rates
in R be ordered such that r1 < r2 <    < rM , where M is the number of market interest rates.
Let M  f1; 2; : : : ;Mg. For each m 2 M, denote the amount of credit given at rm 2 R as Lm
(> 0). Let lDm(r) denote the residual demand at r. Due to random rationing, residual demand is
determined recursively by
lDm+1(r) =

1  Lm
lDm(rm)

lDm(r); r > rm; (A.6)
for m 2MnfMg.
LEMMA A.4: Residual demand satises lD1 (r) = L
D(r) and
lDm(r) =
"
1 
m 1X
m0=1
Lm0
LD(rm0)
#
LD(r); r > rm 1; (A.7)
for m 2Mnf1g.
Proof: The proof parallels that of Lemma A.1. lD1 (r) = L
D(r) is obvious. We prove the validity of
(A.7) by induction on m. Suppose (A.7) holds for m. Substituting for lDm(rm) and l
D
m(r) from (A.7)
3
in (A.6) proves the validity of (A.7) for m+ 1:
lDm+1(r) =

1  Lm
lDm(rm)

lDm(r)
= lDm(r)  Lm
lDm(r)
lDm(rm)
=
"
1 
m 1X
m0=1
Lm0
LD(rm0)
#
LD(r)  Lm L
D(r)
LD(rm)
=
"
1 
mX
m0=1
Lm0
LD(rm0)
#
LD(r): ===
LEMMA A.5: Residual demand satises
lDm(rm) >
MX
m0=m
Lm0
for m 2MnfMg.
Proof: From the fact that lDm(r) is strictly decreasing, Lm < l
D
m(rm) for m 2MnfMg, the ordering
convention rm < rm+1, and (A.6),
lDm(rm) = Lm +

1  Lm
lDm(rm)

lDm(rm)
> Lm +

1  Lm
lDm(rm)

lDm(rm+1)
= Lm + l
D
m+1(rm+1) (A.8)
for m 2MnfMg. For given m 2MnfM   1;M   2g, we assert that
lDm(rm) >
m00X
m0=m
Lm0 + l
D
m00+1(rm00+1) (A.9)
holds true for all m00 2 Mnf1; : : : ;m   1;Mg. (A.8) proves the validity of (A.9) for m00 = m.
We prove (A.9) by induction on m00. From the induction hypothesis and lDm00+1(rm00+1)  Lm00+1 >
lDm00+2(rm00+2) (from (A.8)),
lDm(rm) >
m00X
m0=m
Lm0 + l
D
m00+1(rm00+1)
=
m00+1X
m0=m
Lm0   Lm00+1 + lDm00+1(rm00+1)
>
m00+1X
m0=m
Lm0 + l
D
m00+2(rm00+2):
4
This proves the validity of (A.9) for m00+1 and, hence, for all m00 2Mnf1; : : : ;m  1;Mg. Setting
m00 =M   1 and using LM  lDM (rM ) yields
lDm(rm) >
M 1X
m0=m
Lm0 + l
D
M (rM )

MX
m0=m
Lm0 : ===
For each m 2 M, let m = maxfkj k 2 K; rk = rmg denote the maximum credit limit of those
banks k which set rm. Given that (one of) the bank(s) with the highest credit limit alone serves
the entire market demand, the amount of credit given at rm is
Lm = min

m; l
D
m(rm)
	
: (A.10)
Starting from a strategy prole f(rk; k)gk2K, let the strategies change in such a way that one of
the following two situations arises.
(a) Credit given becomes positive for exactly one interest rate, and credit supply remains unchanged
at all market interest rates:
,! (1 + )Lmd = Lmd > 0 at one rmd 62 R;
,! m = 0 for all rm 2 R.
(b) Credit given increases at exactly one interest rate, and credit supply remains unchanged at all
other market interest rates:
,! Lmd > 0 at one rmd 2 R;
,! m = 0 for all rm 2 Rnfrmdg.
Let md = 0 and Md =M[ f0g in case (a) and Md =M in case (b).
LEMMA A.6: (
P
m2Md Lm) > 0 in both cases (a) and (b). (
P
m2Md Lm)! 0 as Lmd ! 0.
Proof: We focus on case (a). [The necessary changes in case (b) are inserted in brackets.]
To begin with, let rmd > rM [rmd = rM in case (b)]. From (A.7) and (A.10), residual demands and
credit given at all interest rates rm, m 2M [m 2MnfMg in case (b)] are unaected:
Lm = 0 for m 2M
[for m 2MnfMg in case (b)]. So Lmd = L0 > 0 [Lmd = LM > 0 in case (b)] yields

0@ X
m2Md
Lm
1A = Lmd > 0:
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Obviously, (
P
m2Md Lm)! 0 as Lmd ! 0.
If, on the other hand, rmd < rM , let rm0 denote the lowest interest rate above rmd : rm0 1 < rmd <
rm0 [m
0 = md in case (b)]. From (A.7) and (A.10), Lmd does not aect residual demand or credit
given at lower interest rates:
Lm = 0 for m 2 f1; : : : ;m0   1g: (A.11)
The fact that rmd < rM implies that for the initial strategy prole, there is excess demand at rmd
and, therefore, positive residual demand at higher interest rates rm, m 2 fm0; : : : ;Mg [here and
throughout the remainder of the proof, replace m0 with m0 + 1 in case (b)]. As Lmd > 0, (A.7)
implies that these residual demands fall. We have to distinguish three cases.
(1) (1 + )Lmd < l
D
md
(rmd) and m < (1 + )l
D
m(rm) for all m 2 fm0; : : : ;M   1g:
That is, Lmd is small enough such that the excess demands at interest rates up to rM 1 remain
positive. This is satised for Lmd ! 0. We then have
Lm = 0 for m 2 fm0; : : : ;M   1g (A.12)
[in case (b), if rmd = rM 1, then (A.12) drops out]. Furthermore, from (A.7), (A.11), and (A.12),
lDM (rM ) =  
Lmd
LD(rmd)
LD(rM ): (A.13)
If LM = l
D
M (rM ), then M  lDM (rM ). Using (A.13), we have
LM = l
D
M (rM )
=   L
D(rM )
LD(rmd)
Lmd : (A.14)
Adding up (A.11), Lmd , (A.12), (A.14) and using rmd < rM and Lmd > 0, we obtain

0@ X
m2Md
Lm
1A = 1  LD(rM )
LD(rmd)

Lmd > 0:
Obviously, (
P
m2Md Lm)! 0 as Lmd ! 0.
If, on the other hand, LM < l
D
M (rM ), then M = LM . Using (A.10), the case distinction LM <
6
lDM (rM ), and (A.13), it follows that
LM = min

M ; (1 + )l
D
M (rM )
	  LM
= min

M   LM ; lDM (rM ) + lDM (rM )  LM
	
= min

0; lDM (rM ) + l
D
M (rM )  LM
	
 min0; lDM (rM )	 (A.15)
= min

0;   L
D(rM )
LD(rmd)
Lmd

=   L
D(rM )
LD(rmd)
Lmd :
Hence, from (A.11), (A.12), rmd < rM , and Lmd > 0,

0@ X
m2Md
Lm
1A  1  LD(rM )
LD(rmd)

Lmd > 0: (A.16)
As Lmd ! 0, we have, from (A.13), lDM (rM ) ! 0. Together with the case distinction LM <
lDM (rM ), it follows that the equality sign holds in (A.15) and, hence, in the former inequality in
(A.16). So (
P
m2Md Lm)! 0 as Lmd ! 0.
(2) (1+)Lmd < l
D
md
(rmd), but m < (1+)l
D
m(rm) does not hold true for all m 2 fm0; : : : ;M 1g:
In this case [which cannot occur if rmd = rM 1 in case (b)], there is m00 2 fm0; : : : ;M   1g such
that m00  (1 + )lDm00(rm00) > 0. The fact that there is positive residual demand at rm00 (as
(1 + )lDm00(rm00) > 0) implies m < (1 + )l
D
m(rm) for m 2 fm0; : : : ;m00   1g. Hence, from (A.7)
and (A.10),
Lm = 0 for m 2 fm0; : : : ;m00   1g: (A.17)
From (A.7), (A.11), and (A.17),
lDm00(rm00) =  
Lmd
LD(rmd)
LD(rm00):
Using (1 + )Lm00 = (1 +)l
D
m00(rm00), we have
Lm00 = (1 +)l
D
m00(rm00)  Lm00
=  L
D(rm00)
LD(rmd)
Lmd + l
D
m00(rm00)  Lm00 : (A.18)
There is no residual demand at rm for m 2 fm00 + 1; : : : ;Mg (as m00  (1 + )lDm00(rm00)). So
Lm =  Lm for m 2 fm00 + 1; : : : ;Mg: (A.19)
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Adding up (A.11), Lmd , and (A.17)-(A.19) yields

0@ X
m2Md
Lm
1A = 1  LD(rm00)
LD(rmd)

Lmd + l
D
m00(rm00) 
MX
m=m00
Lm > 0:
The inequality sign follows rmd < rm00 , Lmd > 0, and l
D
m00(rm00) >
PM
m=m00 Lm (from Lemma A.5).
(3) (1 + )Lmd = l
D
md
(rmd):
In this case,
Lmd = l
D
md(rmd) (A.20)
[Lmd = l
D
md
(rmd)   Lmd in case (b)]. Since there is no residual demand at interest rates above
rmd ,
Lm =  Lm for m 2 fm0; : : : ;Mg: (A.21)
Adding up (A.11), (A.20), and (A.21) yields

0@ X
m2Md
Lm
1A = lDmd(rmd) 
 
Lmd +
MX
m=m0
Lm
!
> 0:
The inequality sign follows from the fact that lD
md
(rmd) > Lmd +
PM
m=m0 Lm (from Lemma A.5).
///
This is Lemma 2 in the main text.
A.3 Payo functions
LEMMA A.7: %(rm) gives the return on lending for all rm 2 R.
Proof: At each interest rate rm 2 R rationing, if it occurs, is random (the probability of receiving
funds Lm=l
D
m(rm) is uniform across types). Consequently, the relative frequencies of types  2
[#(rm); 
max] which still have not received credit and, therefore, the relative frequencies of those
types  2 [#(rm+1); max] which demand credit at rm+1 do not change. Applying this reasoning
recursively, starting at m = 1, proves the lemma. ///
For each rm 2 R, let Km = fk 2 Kj (rk; k) = (rm;m)g denote the set of banks which set
the maximum credit limit. Let K+ = fk 2 Kj lk > 0g denote the set of banks which give credit in
equilibrium. If Km contains a single bank k, then k 2 K+. If Km contains several banks k, according
to the tie-breaking rule, the probability of being in K+ is (#Km) 1 for each of these banks. Since
at each market interest rate rm 2 R only one bank k serves the market demand, we can relabel the
banks k in K+ such that k = m for m 2 M, reinterpret lDk (rk) = lDm(rm) as the residual demand
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faced by bank k, and let lk = Lm denote credit given by bank k 2 K+. From (A.7) and (A.10), we
then have
lDk (rk) =
"
1 
k 1X
k0=1
lk0
LD(rk0)
#
LD(rk) (A.22)
and
lk = minfk; lDk (rk)g (A.23)
for k 2 K+. lk = 0 for k 62 K+. Using Lemma A.7, bank k's prot is
k =
8<: [1 + %(rk)]lk   (1 + k)dk; for dk  lk; for dk < lk (A.24)
for k 2 K. This equation maps strategy proles f(rk; k); (k; k)gk2K to expected payos Ek
for k 2 K. In the credit subgame, the choices f(rk; k)gk2K together with the tie-breaking rule
determine K+. While lk = 0 for k 62 K+, (A.22) and (A.23) determine lk for k 2 K+. In the deposit
subgame, the choices f(k; k)gk2K determine dk via (A.2), (A.3), and (A.4).
Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 1
Given the strategies in Theorem 1, the tie-breaking rule determines one bank, k = 1 say, which
serves credit demand at r and another bank, k = 2 say, which serves the residual demand at
r. From (A.23), these banks give credit l1 = minfL; LD(r)g = L and l2 = minfLS()  
L; lD2 (r)g, respectively. lk = 0 for all other banks k so K+ = f1; 2g. By bidding 1 = 2 = ,
the two banks in K+ raise deposits LS(). From the denition of x and Lemma A.4, it follows
that the residual demand at r, lD2 (r) = (1   x)LD(r), equals supply l2 = LS()   L. So
aggregate credit given is
P
k2K lk = l1 + l2 = L
S(). From (A.3), dk = lk for both banks k 2 K+.
%(r) = %(r) =  and Lemma A.7 imply zero expected prot for both banks (E1 = E2 = 0).
To prove Theorem 1, we have to show that deviations from the strategies in the theorem are not
protable.
Throughout we make the following two labeling conventions. First, when starting from a given
strategy prole, banks k are labeled as explained in Appendix A.3, they keep their label after a
change in the strategy prole. For instance, if K is thy only bank setting the maximum market
interest rate rK initially, we denote the post-change interest rate it sets as (1 +)rK even if there
are now other banks with higher interest rates. Second, when more than one bank set rk, we label
the bank that is determined by the random tie-breaking rule as k, although a dierent bank may
be chosen by the tie-breaking rule after a change in the strategy prole.
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Figure B.1: Equilibrium deposit rate
B.1 Deposit subgame
If a bank k 2 K+ raises deposits dk equal to the amount of loans it makes lk its payo (A.24)
simplies to
k = [%(rk)  k] lk; k 2 K+: (B.1)
For a given deposit rate 0, let K++0 be the subset of banks k 2 K+ which (weakly) prefer raising
dk = lk to default: K++0 = fk 2 Kj k 2 K+; [%(rk)   0]lk  g. As 0 rises, elements of K++0
successively drop out. So
P
k2K++0 lk is a decreasing step function (see Figure B.1). (a) If there is a
solution 0 to
P
k2K++0 lk = L
S(0), denote it as  (see the left panel of Figure B.1). (b) Otherwise,
let  be the deposit rate 0 such that
P
k2K++0 lk > L
S(0) for 0 =  and
P
k2K++0 lk < L
S(0) for
0 >  (see the right panel of Figure B.1). Let K0 be the subset of banks k which are indierent
between raising dk = lk at  and default in this case: K0 = fk 2 Kj k 2 K++; [%(rk)   ]lk = g.
Finally, let fd0kgk2K0 be any set of deposits for k 2 K0 such that d0k < lk for all k 2 K0 andX
k2K0
d0k = L
S() 
X
k2K++nK0
lk: (B.2)
The denition of  implies that such a set of deposits exists. Letting K0 = ; in case (a), we can
treat both cases using the same notation. Notice that if K++ = K+ and K0 = ;, then, using lk = 0
for k 62 K+, (B.2) becomes
 = (LS) 1
 X
k2K
lk
!
(B.3)
(this holds true, for example, if one assumes  =  1, so that all banks in K+ strictly prefer any
loss to default and K0 = ;).
LEMMA B.1: Suppose d0k satises (B.2) for k 2 K0, and let  be given by (B.3). Then the follow-
ing strategies are a Nash equilibrium of the deposit subgame: (k; k) = (; lk) for k 2 K++nK0,
(k; k) = (; d
0
k) for k 2 K0, and (k; k) = (0; 0) for k 62 K++.
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Proof: Banks k 2 K++ acquire funds by paying a common deposit rate . From (B.2), demand
equals supply in the market for deposits:X
k2K
k =
X
k2K++nK0
lk +
X
k2K0
d0k
= LS():
So, from (A.3), dk = k for all k 2 K++. We now consider the three groups of banks distinguished
in the lemma successively. We have to show that no bank can raise its payo by deviating with
(k; k) 6= (0; 0).
Consider rst a bank kd 2 K++nK0. From the denition of K++, the fact that dkd = lkd , and
(B.1), we have kd   (with strict inequality in case (b)). As dkd = lkd , any deviating strategy
(1 + )(kd ; kd) which gives rise to dkd < 0 implies default and, therefore, is unprotable:
(1 + )kd =   kd . Clearly, this occurs for kd < 0. The same also holds true for bids with
kd < 0. To see this, notice that Lemma A.2 implies that the supply of deposits falls below L
S()
if kd < 0, so that dkd < 0, since all other banks bid a higher rate than k
d. So only deviating
strategies with dkd  0 and kd  0 and with one inequality strict avoid default. However, this
implies [(1 + kd)dkd ] > 0 and, from (A.24) and the fact that rkd and lkd are determined in the
credit subgame already, kd < 0. Hence, any deviating strategy, whether it leads to default or
not, reduces prot.
Next, consider a bank kd 2 K0 (which is non-empty in case (b) only). The strategy in the lemma
implies default: kd = , since k = d
0
k < lk. Any deviating strategy that also leads to default is
equally protable: (1 + )kd = . A deviating strategy that avoids default necessarily satises
(1 + )dkd  lkd > 0. Since supply equals demand in the market for deposits and the supply is
shared in proportion to the bids made in the case of excess demand for deposits, this necessitates
(1 + )kd > . Together with (A.24), this implies
(1 + )kd = [1 + %(rkd)]lkd   [1 + (1 + )kd ](1 + )dkd
< [1 + %(rkd)]lkd   (1 + )lkd
= [%(rkd)  ]lkd
= : (B.4)
So deviating with a non-default strategy decreases prot below the default level.
Banks k 62 K++ can be subdivided into banks k 2 K+nK++ and banks k 62 K+. Banks k 2 K+nK++
default, for they have chosen lk > 0 but do not get deposits (since k = 0). By the same reasoning
as above, in order to improve upon the default payo , a bank kd 2 K+nK++ has to deviate such
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that (1+)dkd  lkd > 0 and (1+)kd > . But from (B.4), this is unprotable: (1+)kd < .
Finally, banks k 62 K+ make zero prot. Since they do not generate returns in the credit subgame,
there is no way of improving upon this outcome.
Notice that this holds true even if there is only one bank active in the credit market (i.e., K+ = f1g).
In this case, from (B.3),  = (LS) 1(l1). ///
This is Lemma 1 in the main text. From the lemma, it follows that the bidding strategies in Theorem
1 constitute a Nash equilibrium in the deposit subgame. K++ = K+ = f1; 2g and  =  = %(r) =
%(r) satisfy the denitions of K++ and  (case (a)): K++ = fk 2 Kj k 2 K+; [%(rk)   ]lk  g
and
P
k2K++ lk = L
S(). So (1; 1) = (; l1) = (
; L), (2; 2) = (; l2) = (; LS()   L), and
(k; k) = (0; 0) for k 62 f1; 2g constitute a Nash equilibrium.
B.2 Credit subgame
To complete the proof of Theorem 1, it remains for us to show that, given the Nash equilibrium
strategies in the deposit subgame described in Lemma B.1, it is not possible for any bank kd 2 K to
make positive expected prot (1 + )(Ekd) > 0 with a deviating strategy in the credit subgame,
i.e., with (rkd ; kd) 6= (0; 0).
Setting an interest rate (1 + )rkd > r
 is not protable because residual demand is zero. This
follows from the fact that supply equals residual demand at r. So we focus on strategies (1 +
)(rkd ; kd) with (1 + )rkd  r.
Since at each interest rate, only the banks with the highest credit limit have a positive probability
of making loans, (1 + )rkd = r
 and (1 + )kd < LS()   L does not generate prot. Since,
by assumption, two banks choose (rk; k) = (r
; LS() L) initially, this holds true even if kd is
one of these two banks. If some other bank kd plays (1 +)(rkd ; kd) = (r
; LS() L), it faces
a positive probability of being selected by the tie-breaking rule. However, even then it makes zero
prot. By setting a credit limit (1+)kd > L
S() L bank kd captures the market at r with
certainty. But since there is no excess demand at r, bank kd merely adopts the role of bank 2,
serves the residual demand lD2 (r
) (= LS()  L), and makes zero prot.
If kd chooses (1+)rkd = r
 and (1+)kd > L, it captures the entire demand at r and makes
a return %((1+)rkd) = 
. Since demand at r exceeds L, bank kd makes loans (1+)lkd > L.
By assumption, two banks choose (rk; k) = (r
; LS()   L) initially. So even if kd is one of
these banks, the supply of credit remains unchanged at the higher interest rate, while credit given
rises at the lower rate. From Lemma A.6 (case (b)), it follows that (
P
k2K lk) > 0, even though
l2 < 0. Hence, as illustrated in Figure B.2, (
P
k2K++0 lk) > 0 for 
0 small enough such that
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Figure B.2: Change in the equilibrium deposit rate when a bank deviates in the credit subgame
all k 2 K+ prefer dk = lk over default. Suppose kd's deviation is protable: (1 + )kd > 0. We
will derive a contradiction. Suppose rst that the deposit rate 0 above which 2 prefers default
over (1 + )d2 = (1 + )l2 does not exceed the deposit rate above which k
d prefers default over
(1 + )dkd = (1 +)lkd . We have to distinguish three cases. (a) There is (1 + ) > 
 such that
(1+)lkd+(1+)l2 = L
S((1+)) (see the left panel of Figure B.2). From Lemma B.1, (1+)
is the equilibrium deposit rate. Since (1+) > , this contradicts the fact that kd makes a prot:
(1 + )kd = [
   (1 + )](1 + )lkd < 0:
In the other two cases, (b) and (c), since l2 < 0, the deposit rate 
0 above which bank 2 prefers
default over (1 + )d2 = (1 + )l2 rises. Given the premise that k
d does not default, it follows
that the rst step of the function (1 + )(
P
k2K++0 lk) occurs at a higher deposit rate 
0 than
before, in particular at a deposit rate greater than . (b) Suppose there is (1 + ) such that
(1+)lkd+(1+)l2 > L
S((1+)) > (1+)lkd (see the middle panel of Figure B.2). From Lemma
B.1, (1+) is the equilibrium deposit rate. It follows that (1+) > , which again contradicts
(1+)kd > 0. (c) Otherwise there is (1+) > 
 such that (1+)lkd = LS((1+)) (see the right
panel of Figure B.2). From Lemma B.1, (1+) is the equilibrium interest rate and (1+)kd < 0,
a contradiction. If the deposit rate above which 2 prefers default over (1 + )d2 = (1 + )l2 does
exceed the analogous deposit rate for kd, case (a) is treated analogously. Otherwise it is bank kd
that ceases to prefer (1+)dkd = (1+)lkd at the rst downward discontinuity of the step function
(1+)(
P
k2K++0 lk). From the case distinction made, (1+) is no less than the 
0-value at which
this discontinuity occurs. So kd defaults in the deposit market equilibrium, again contradicting
(1 + )kd > 0.
The remaining possibility is a deviating strategy (1+)(rkd ; kd) with (1+)rkd < r
, (1+)rkd 6=
r, and (1+)kd > 0. Due to the assumed shape of the return function, we have %((1+)rkd) < .
Market clearing at r implies positive residual demand for all (1 + )rkd < r. So (1 + )lkd >
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0 and, from Lemma A.6 (case (a)), (
P
k2K lk) > 0. Moreover, lk < 0 for k 2 f1; 2g when
(1 +)rkd < r
, and l2 < 0 = l1 when r < (1 + )rkd < r. Similarly as above, suppose rst
that the deposit rates 0 above which k = 1 and k = 2 prefer default over (1 + )dk = (1 + )lk
do not exceed the deposit rate above which kd prefers default over (1 + )dkd = (1 +)lkd . (a) If
there is (1 +) >  such that (1 +)lkd + (1+)l1 + (1+)l2 = LS((1 +)), then (1 +)
is the equilibrium deposit rate. Since (1 + ) > , kd makes a loss:
(1 + )kd = [%((1 + )rkd)  (1 + )](1 + )lkd < 0:
In the other two cases, (b) and (c), since lk  0 for k 2 f1; 2g, the deposit rates 0 above which
banks k = 1 and k = 2 prefer default over (1 + )dk = (1 + )lk do not fall. Since lk < 0
for at least one k 2 f1; 2g, the rate rises for at least one k. So the rst step of the function
(1 + )(
P
k2K++0 lk) occurs at a higher deposit rate 
0 than before. By the same reasoning as in
the preceding paragraph, irrespective of whether (b) (1+)(
P
k2K++0 lk) intersects L
S(0) at some
 or (c) not, the equilibrium interest rate  exceeds , so kd's prot is negative. Next, suppose
rst that the deposit rate 0 above which kd prefers default over (1 + )dkd = (1 + )lkd lies in
between the corresponding rates for banks 1 and 2. As noted above, since lk  0 for k 2 f1; 2g,
no bank prefers default at deposit rates up to , for (1 + )(
P
k2K++0 lk) > L
S(0) at 0 = ,
so that (1 + ) >  and (1 + )kd < 0. Finally, suppose kd is the rst bank to prefer default
as 0 rises. If (1 + )(
P
k2K++0 lk) intersects L
S(0) at some 0 = (1 + ) lower than the rate
at which kd prefers default, (1 + ) >  is the equilibrium interest rate, and (1 + )kd < 0.
Otherwise the deposit market equilibrium occurs at a rate 0 at which kd prefers to default, so that
(1 + )kd =  < 0. Hence, in each case, k
d's prot from the deviating strategy (1 + )(rkd ; kd)
is negative. This completes the proof of Theorem 1. ///
Appendix C. Proof of Theorem 2
C.1 Deposit subgame
Observe, to begin with, that default cannot occur in equilibrium. To see this, suppose there is a
bank k 2 K+ (i.e., with lk > 0) which defaults. The only other thing that could have happened
is that the bank would not have been selected by the tie-breaking rule (if there are other banks
setting the same interest rate and credit limit), so that zero prot would have ensued. So expected
prot Ek is negative. The fact that zero prot with certainty is possible rules out this possibility.
Consequently, K++ = K+ and K0 = ;, and  is given by (B.3).
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It follows that in equilibrium banks k 2 K+ choose (k; k) such that dk  lk, since otherwise they
suer default. Suppose a bank kd 2 K+ chooses (kd ; kd) such that dkd > lkd . From (A.3), dk is
continuous and increasing in k, and dk = 0 for k = 0. Thus, there exists a kd < 0 such that
(1 + )dkd = lkd for (1 + )(kd ; kd) = (kd ; (1 + )kd). As rkd and lkd are determined in the
credit subgame already, (A.24) implies kd > 0. So dk = lk for all k 2 K+.
Banks k 62 K+ make zero prot if dk = 0. Any bid (k; k) such that dk > 0 entails k < 0, which
cannot occur in equilibrium. So dk = lk holds true for k 62 K+ as well. Consequently, payos are
given by (B.1), and, from Lemma B.1, the amount of deposits made equals the amount of credit
given:
PN
n=1Dn =
P
k2K lk.
Suppose k < , where  is given by (B.3), for some k 2 K+. Lemma A.2 then rules out k   for
all k 2 K+, for this would entail default for some bank, as aggregate deposits fall short of credit
given:
NX
n=1
Dn < L
S()
=
X
k2K
lk:
So if k <  for some k 2 K+, then the highest market deposit rate 1 satises 1 > . Suppose K1,
the set of banks bidding 1, contains only one bank, k
d say. The fact that a bank k bidding k < 
faces positive residual supply (which is implied by dk = lk > 0 for all k 2 K+) means that kd can
decrease kd slightly and still raise deposits lkd . So a Nash equilibrium does not prevail. If, on the
other hand, K1 contains more than one bank k 2 K, then dk = k for all k 2 K1 (since dk > 0
for some bank k with k < ). Let a bank k
d 2 K1 choose (1 + )(kd ; kd) with kd negative
and small in absolute value and kd = 0. The demand for deposits at 1 falls by kd = dkd = lkd .
From Lemma A.3, the residual supply at (1 + )kd rises by approximately lkd . The fact that the
residual supply at k (< ) is positive implies that the residual supply at (1 + )kd is sucient
so as to raise lkd . So we can rule out k <  for some k 2 K+ in a Nash equilibrium. So k   for
all k 2 K+. In order to prove that k =  for all k 2 K+ it remains for us to rule out k >  for
some k 2 K+.
If there is more than one market deposit rate (i.e., N > 1), the arguments put forward in the
preceding paragraph prove that it is possible for each bank k 2 K1 setting the highest market
deposit rate 1 to raise prot by decreasing the deposit rate slightly. So consider the case of a single
deposit rate (i.e., N = 1), 1 > . K1 = K+ in this case. From dk = lk for all k 2 K, (B.3), and the
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fact that LS() is strictly increasing, we haveX
k2K1
dk =
X
k2K
dk
=
X
k2K
lk
= LS()
< LS(1): (C.1)
From (A.3) with n = 1, lS1 (1) = L
S(1), and (C.1), we have
X
k2K1
dk =
X
k2K1
min
(
k;
kP
k02K1 k0
LS(1)
)
=
X
k2K1
kmin
(
1;
1P
k02K1 k0
LS(1)
)
= min
(
1;
1P
k02K1 k0
LS(1)
) X
k2K1
k
= min
8<:X
k2K1
k; L
S(1)
9=;
=
X
k2K1
k:
From the fact that dk  k for all k 2 K1, it follows that dk = k and, hence, lk = k for all
k 2 K1. Suppose a bank kd 2 K1 deviates with kd negative and small in absolute value. The
amount of deposits raised at 1 falls by lkd . Lemma A.3 implies that demand at (1+)kd increases
by approximately the same amount. Together with the fact that there is excess supply at 1 (cf.
(C.1)), it follows that kd faces sucient residual supply at (1 +)kd so as to raise lkd . So a Nash
equilibrium does not prevail. This completes the proof that dk = lk for all k 2 K and k =  (with
 given by (B.3)) for all k 2 K+ in any Nash equilibrium of the deposit subgame.
C.2 Credit subgame
Let K+++ be the subset of banks with strictly positive expected payo as of stage one in equilibrium:
K+++ = fk 2 KjEk > 0g.
LEMMA C.1: K+++ = ; or K+++ = K.
Proof: Suppose to the contrary that Ek > 0 and Ekd = 0 for fk; kdg  K. kd can also make a
positive expected prot by choosing (1 + )(rkd ; kd) = (rk; k). ///
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LEMMA C.2: rk 6= rkd if fk; kdg  K+++.
Proof: Suppose the contrary: rk = rkd for fk; kdg  K+++. This implies k = kd . We have to
distinguish two cases: (a) there is excess demand at rkd or (b) not.
(a) Suppose there is excess demand at rkd : k = kd < l
D
kd
(rkd). Let k
d deviate with rkd = 0 and
kd = , where  > 0. Given the random tie-breaking rule, k
d's probability of serving the market
rises from (#fkj rk = rkdg) 1 (< 1) to unity. Excess demand at rkd implies lkd = kd =  for
 small enough. From Lemma A.6 (case (b)) and (B.3),  rises, and the increase converges to
zero as  ! 0. As the probability of serving the demand for loans jumps upward, while %(rkd) is
unchanged and lkd and  go to zero as ! 0, it follows from (B.1) that (Ekd) > 0.
(b) Next, suppose there is no excess demand at rkd : k = kd  lDkd(rkd). This implies that rkd is the
highest market interest rate. Suppose kd deviates by making loans to all rms that demand credit
at (1+)rkd , where rkd =  is negative and small in absolute value. As above, the probability of
facing positive demand jumps upward. All other arguments of the payo function (B.1) go to zero
as  ! 0: %(rkd + ) ! %(rkd) because of continuity of the return function; (1 + )lkd ! lDkd(rkd)
because of the continuity of the residual demand functions; from Lemma A.6, (
P
k2K lk) ! 0
because (
P
k2K lk) = (1+)lkd   lDkd(rkd), as three is no residual demand left at rkd ; from (B.3),
! 0. So from (B.1), (Ekd) > 0. ///
LEMMA C.3: lDK(rK) = lK if K+++ = K.
Proof: K+++ = K and Lemma C.2 imply that one bank K alone sets the maximum market interest
rate rK . Therefore, lK > 0 with probability one. Suppose l
D
K(rK) > lK , i.e., K does not satisfy
the total residual demand it faces. Let K deviate with rK = , where rK +  > rK 1 and
%(rK + ) > %(rK) (i.e.,  > 0 if %(r) is increasing at rK and  < 0 if %(r) is decreasing at rK),
and K = 0. Because of excess demand, lK = K = 0 for  small enough. Given that lK is
constant, so is
P
k2K lk. From (B.3),  = 0. From (B.1), (EK) > 0. ///
LEMMA C.4: K+++ = ;.
Proof: Suppose not. Then, from Lemmas C.1-C.3, EK > 0, EK 1 > 0, rK > rK 1, and lDK(rK) =
lK .
(a) Let K deviate with (1+)(rK ; K) = (rK 1; K 1+ ), where  > 0. Analogously to the proof
of Lemma A.6 (which does not apply directly because the supply of credit falls at rK), we have
lk = 0 for k 2 f1; : : : ;K   2g: (C.2)
K 2 K+++ implies excess demand at rK 1 and, hence, lK 1 = K 1. So bank K   1 is pushed out
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of the market:
lK 1 =  lK 1 (C.3)
Furthermore, excess demand at rK 1 implies (1 + )lK = lK 1 + , i.e.,
lK = lK 1 +   lK (C.4)
for  small enough. Since, moreover, no bank sets an interest rate above rK (this would imply zero
prot, contradicting K+++ = K), adding up (C.2)-(C.4) yields

 X
k2K
lk
!
=   lK < 0
for  small enough. That is, aggregate credit given and, from (B.3), the deposit rate jump downward.
From (B.1), we have
(1 + )(EK) = [%(rK 1)  (1 + )](lK 1 + )
> [%(rK 1)  ]lK 1
= EK 1 (C.5)
for  small enough.
(b) Next, let K   1 deviate with (1+)(rK 1; K 1) = (rK + ; lDK 1(rK + )), where  is negative
and small enough in absolute value such that rK +  > rK 1. (C.2) holds true. Bank K   1's credit
given changes by
lK 1 = lDK 1(rK + )  lK 1: (C.6)
Since there is no excess demand left at (1 + )rK 1 = rK + ,
lK =  lK : (C.7)
Adding up (C.2), (C.6), and (C.7) and letting ! 0 yields

 X
k2K
lk
!
= lDK 1(rK + )  (lK 1 + lK)
! lDK 1(rK)  (lK 1 + lK) (C.8)
as ! 0. From (A.6) (with m = K   1, r = rK , and Lm = lK 1),
lDK(rK) =
"
1  lK 1
lDK 1(rK 1)
#
lDK 1(rK):
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Hence, using lDK(rK) = lK and the fact that rK > rK 1,
lK 1 + lK = lK 1
"
1  l
D
K 1(rK)
lDK 1(rK 1)
#
+ lDK 1(rK)
> lDK 1(rK):
From (C.8), it follows that, for  ! 0, the deviating strategy (1 + )(rK 1; K 1) = (rK +
; lDK 1(rK + )) causes a downward jump in
P
k2K lk. From (B.3), the deposit rate falls dis-
continuously:  < 0. Together with the fact that the return function %(r) is continuous and
lDK 1(rK) > l
D
K(rK) = lK , it follows from (B.1) that
(1 + )(EK 1) = [%(rK + )  (1 + )]lDK 1(rK + )
> [%(rK)  ]lK
= EK
for ! 0.
So we have (1+)(EK) > EK 1 and (1+)(EK 1) > EK . As shown in the main text, this
is not consistent with the denition of a Nash equilibrium. ///
Notice that the analysis so far holds true independently of the shape of the return function.
LEMMA C.5: r1 = r
 and r2 = r are the only market interest rates.
Proof: Clearly, M = ; (no credit given) cannot arise in equilibrium. M = ; implies rk  rmax or
k = 0 for all k 2 K. Any (1+)(rkd ; kd) such that %(rkd) > (LS) 1(lkd) yields (1+)(Ekd) > 0.
Suppose next that there is a single equilibrium interest rate r1, so that M = f1g and, given the
convention k = m, K+ = f1g. Consider a bank kd 2 Knf1g. Suppose there is excess demand at r1
(i.e., lD1 (r1) = L
D(r1) > l1). Then, the fact that K+ = f1g implies that for all k 2 Knf1g, rk = r1
and k  1 or rk  rmax or k = 0. kd 2 Knf1g can make positive expected prot by choosing
(1 + )(rkd ; kd) = (r
max + ; ) with  negative and small in absolute value and  positive and
small. Because of excess demand at r1, (1+)lkd =  with probability one for  small. By virtue of
Lemma A.6 and (B.3), ! 0 and thus %(rmax + ) > (1 +) as ! 0 and  ! 0. From (B.1),
(1 + )kd > 0. This rules out excess demand in a single-interest equilibrium.
So l1 = l
D
1 (r1) = L
D(r1). From Lemma B.1, in the deposit subgame, bank 1 bids 1 =
(LS) 1(LD(r1)) and gets d1 = LD(r1). Hence, LS(1) = LD(r1). According to Lemma C.4, bank
1 makes zero prot: 1 = %(r1). So L
S(%(r1)) = L
D(r1). Given the assumed continuity and shape
of the return, demand, and supply functions (with LD(r) > LS(%(r)) and LD(r) < LS(%(r))
and with LD(r)   LS(%(r)) decreasing for r < r and for r > r), this implies r < r1 < r.
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It follows that the demand for credit is positive at r and that %(r1) < . Suppose kd chooses
(1 + )(rkd ; kd) = (r
; ), where  is positive and small. The fact that the demand for credit is
positive at r implies (1 + )lkd =  with probability one. From Lemma A.6 and (B.3),  is
small. It follows that %(r) =  > (1 + ). From (B.1), (1 + )(Ekd) > 0. This rules out a
single-interest rate equilibrium.
Given that all banks k 2 K+ get deposits dk = lk (> 0) and pay a common deposit rate  (Lemma
B.1) and make zero expected prot (Lemma C.4), (B.1) implies that all banks k 2 K+ realize the
same return %(rk) = . Given the assumed shape of the return function, identical returns at all, and
at at least two, market interest rates implies that either (as asserted by the lemma) the equilibrium
is a two-interest rate equilibrium with credit given positive for r and r and for no other interest
rate, or else K+ consists of two or three banks, %(rk) <  for all k 2 K+, and r2 > r. We now
rule out the latter case. Consider a bank kd. If for each rk, k 2 K+, there is a single bank choosing
(rk;k), then let k
d 2 KnK+ (the fact that there are two or three banks in K+ and at least four
banks in K ensures that KnK+ 6= ;). Otherwise, consider a bank kd either in KnK+ or such that
there is another bank k0 2 K with (rk0 ; k0) = (rkd ; kd). This choice of kdensures that Lemma A.6
is applicable when kd makes loans at a new interest rate. Let kd set (1 + )(rkd ; kd) = (r
; ),
where  is small and positive. r2 > r
 implies that there is positive residual demand at r, so that
(1 + )lkd =  with probability one. By virtue of Lemma A.6 and (B.3),  ! 0 as  ! 0. So
(1 + )(Ekd) = [
   (1 + )](1 + )lkd > 0. This proves that the equilibrium is a two-interest
rate equilibrium with credit given positive for r and r. ///
LEMMA C.6: At least two banks k 2 K set (rk; k) = (r1;1), and at least two banks k 2 K set
(rk; k) = (r2; k) with k  lD2 (r2).
Proof: Suppose (rk; k) = (r1;1) for only one bank k = 1. From Lemma C.5, there is positive
residual demand at r, which implies l1 = 1. Let bank 1 choose (1 + )(r1; 1) = (r; l1 + ),
where  is negative and small enough in absolute value such that bank 1 continues to serve the
market at r (i.e., there is no k 2 K such that rk = r and l1 +   k < l1). If there is excess
demand at r (i.e., l2 = 2 < lD2 (r) = [1  l1=LD(r)]LD(r)), then l2 = 0 and, using l1 = ,

 X
k2K
lk
!
= 
< 0:
If there is no excess demand at r, then l2 = lD2 (r) =  [LD(r)=LD(r)]l1 and, using
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l1 = ,

 X
k2K
lk
!
=

1  L
D(r)
LD(r)


< 0
for  small enough small enough in absolute value.  < 0 in both cases. Since the return %(r) = 
is unaected and (1 + )l1 = l1 +  with probability one, we have, from (B.1), (1 + )(E1) > 0.
Turning to the higher equilibrium interest rate r2 = r
, suppose no bank k sets k  lD2 (r2). Then,
given Lemma C.5, there is positive residual demand for all interest rates in the interval (r; rmax),
so that any bank kd not setting r1 can make positive prot with (1 + )(rkd ; kd) = (r
max + ; ),
where  is negative and small in absolute value and  is positive and small.
So suppose there is exactly one bank k = 2 which chooses (rk; k) = (r2; k) with k  lD2 (r2).
This implies that there is no excess demand at r2 = r
: l2 = lD2 (r). Let bank 2 deviate with
(1 + )r2 = r
 + , where  is positive, so that %(r + ) > . The fact that k = 2 is the
only bank which chooses k  lD2 (r) at r implies that credit given at r by the bank with
the next-highest credit limit, k0 say (notice that lk0 = 0), satises (1 + )lk0 < lD2 (r), so the
residual demand is positive at r + . Let  be small enough such that there is no bank k with
r < rk  r+ . Then bank 2 faces positive residual demand (1+)lD2 (r+ ). Suppose it sets
(1 +)2 = (1+)l
D
2 (r
+ ). Then (1+)l2 = (1+)lD2 (r+ ), and using r+  > r and
Lemma A.5,
(1 + )lk0 + (1 +)l2 < l
D
2 (r
)
= l2:
Hence, using lk0 = 0,

 X
k2K
lk
!
= (1 +)lk0 + (1 +)l2   (l2 + lk0)
< l2   (l2 + lk0)
= 0:
From (B.3),  < 0. As %(r + ) >  = , and  < 0, bank 2's expected prot, as given by
(B.1), becomes positive: (E2) > 0. ///
LEMMA C.7: l1 = L
 and l2 = LS()  L.
Proof: Aggregate credit given obeys
l1 + l2 = L
S(): (C.9)
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Suppose not. Then, from Lemma B.1 and (B.3),
 = (LS) 1(l1 + l2)
6= (LS) 1(LS())
= :
From Lemma C.5 and %(r) = %(r) = , it then follows that Ek 6= 0 for k 2 f1; 2g. This
contradicts Lemma C.4. Given that aggregate credit given is LS(), from (A.22), the residual
demand at r is
lD2 (r
) =

1  l1
LD(r)

LD(r): (C.10)
Suppose l1 < L
. From l2  lD2 (r), (C.10), LD(r) < LD(r), and the denition of L, we obtain
l1 + l2  l1 + lD2 (r)
= l1 +

1  l1
LD(r)

LD(r)
=

1  L
D(r)
LD(r)

l1 + L
D(r)
<

1  L
D(r)
LD(r)

L + LD(r)
= L +

1  L

LD(r)

LD(r)
= LS():
This contradicts (C.9).
Suppose l1 > L
. Then the same formulas as employed above and (C.9) yield
lD2 (r
)  l2 =

1  l1
LD(r)

LD(r)  [LS()  l1]
=

1  L
D(r)
LD(r)

l1 + L
D(r)  LS()
>

1  L
D(r)
LD(r)

L + LD(r)  LS()
=

1  L

LD(r)

LD(r)  [LS()  L]
= 0:
That is, there is excess demand at r. But then (1+)(rkd ; kd) = (rmax+; ), where  is negative
and small in absolute value and  is positive and small, yields (1 +)(Ekd) > 0. This contradicts
Lemma C.4, thereby completing the proof of Lemma C.7 and Theorem 2. ///
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Appendix D: Proof of Theorem 3
The analysis of residual demands and supplies in Appendix A and of the deposit subgame in
Appendix B.1 goes through without modication. Because of market clearing at r, if kd sets (1 +
)rkd > r in the credit subgame, it does not attract rms. Likewise, (1+)rkd = r and (1+)kd <
L implies (1 + )lkd = 0. With (1 + )rkd = r and (1 + )kd > L, k
d takes on the role of bank
1 (that serves the market before kd's deviation) and makes zero prot. Suppose kd deviates with
(1 + )(rkd ; kd) where (1 + )rkd < r and (1 + )kd > 0. l1 < 0 but, from Lemma A.6,
(
P
k2K lk) > 0. As explained in Appendix B.2, if the deposit rate 
0 above which 1 prefers default
over (1 + )d1 = (1 + )l1 does not exceed the deposit rate above which k
d prefers default over
(1 +)dkd = (1 +)lkd , the deposit rises, so (1 +)kd < 0. And if the deposit rate above which
1 prefers default over (1 + )d1 = (1 + )l1 exceeds the analogous deposit rate for k
d, either the
deposit rises or else kd defaults. (1 + )kd < 0 in both cases.
Turning to the \uniqueness" part, the proofs of Lemmas C.1-C.4 go through without modication,
so K+++ = ;, i.e., there is no bank k 2 K that makes positive expected prot Ek. By the same
reasoning as in the proof of Lemma C.5, M 6= ;. As shown in Appendix C.1, all banks k 2 K+
pay the same deposit rate  and acquire deposits dk = lk. It follows that %(rk) =  for all k 2 K+.
Given the assumed monotonicity of %(r), this means that there is a single market interest rate (i.e.,
M = f1g).
Suppose the single market interest rate satises r1 > r, so that L
D(r1) < L
S(%(r1)). Given that
the single active bank 1 acquires deposits d1 = l1  LD(r1), it follows that there is excess supply
in the market for deposits (i.e., d1 < L
S(%(r1))) and, therefore, positive residual supply at lower
rates. So a bank kd can lend (1 + )lkd > 0 at (1 + )rkd slightly below r and raise deposits
(1 + )dkd = (1 +)lkd at a rate below , thereby making a positive prot (1 + )kd .
In the opposite case r1 < r, we have L
S(%(r1)) < L
D(r1) and l1  LS(1), since otherwise bank
1 would default. Using d1 = l1 and zero prot, it follows that l1 < L
D(r1). But that means that
there is excess demand in the credit market. So a bank kd can make a positive prot (1 + )kd
by oering a small amount of credit at interest rate slightly below rmax. ///
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